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I show that intuitive and logical considerations do not justify 
introducing Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals in 
more than a limited form, as applying to atomic formulas. Once this 
is accepted, it follows that Leibniz’s Law generalises to all formulas 
of the first-order Predicate Calculus but not to modal formulas. 
Among other things, identity turns out to be logically contingent. 
 





There is a straightforward formal proof of the necessity of identity, going 
back at least to Quine (1953, 156). It relies on the two derivation rules, 
necessitation (NEC) and Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals 
(LL). NEC enables us to derive □A (‘necessarily A’) from any theorem A. 
Leibniz’s Law allows us to substitute identicals in any formula: 
Leibniz’s Law: a = b, A(a) ⊢ A(b/a) 
A(b/a) is the result of substituting none, some or all occurrences of ‘a’ in 
‘A’ by ‘b’. One formulation and derivation of the necessity of identity runs 
as follows: 
1 (1) a = b   Premise 
 (2) a = a   Axiom (Law of Identity) 
 (3) □(a = a)  NEC 2 
1 (4) □(a = b)  LL 1, 3 
 (5) (a = b) → □(a = b) Implication Introduction 1, 4
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The line number is in parentheses; numbers to its left designate the line 
numbers of the premises, if any, on which the formula in that line depends. 
As can be seen, the formula in line (5) depends on no premise and is thus 
a theorem. It says that if a is identical to b, then a is necessarily identical 
to b. 
 
Although there is a long tradition of considering this result problematic 
(see survey and references in (Burgess 2014)), there is currently no 
generally accepted way of showing the formal considerations 
uncompelling. In this paper, I try to provide reasons for holding them 
such.1 
 
My basic claim is that Leibniz’s Law has been overgeneralised. Suppose a 
is b, and suppose a has a certain property; then b, namely a, has it. Also, if 
a stands in any relation, then b, namely a, stands in that relation. These 
intuitive claims justify Leibniz’s Law as applying to properties and 
relations. To formalise it in logic, we should allow the substitution of 
identicals in formulas that express what we intuitively count as properties 
and relations, namely, one- and many-place predicates. For instance, if 
a = b and P(a), then P(b); or, if a = b and R(a, c), then R(b, c). More 
generally, for any n-place predicate Pn, from a = b and Pn(…a…) we can 
infer Pn(…b/a…): 
a = b, Pn(…a…) ⊢ Pn(…b/a…) 
However, this intuitive justification of Leibniz’s Law does not support 
formalising it as allowing the substitution of identicals in more complex 
formulas, non-atomic ones, which do not just express properties or 
relations. It is not that such substitution is prohibited by the intuitive 
justification, but if it is to be allowed then it should be justified by deriving 
it from the intuitive version or its formalisation. 
 
This cautionary note is further supported by the fact that, with some 
sentences of more complex kinds, the applicability of Leibniz’s Law is far 
from certain. Although Mr Utterson knows he’s an old friend of Dr Henry 
Jekyll, does he also know he’s an old friend of Mr Edward Hyde? Even if 
he does, this should be shown. Namely, we cannot assume that Leibniz’s 
Law applies to all sentences but we need to derive its applicability from its 
limited, basic form, applied only to atomic sentences. 
                                                 
1 A referee for this journal drew my attention to (Garson 2013: §12.3), where similar ideas 
to some of those developed below are to be found. Garson, however, justifies his views by 
claiming that substitutivity does not generally hold in modal contexts, while I attempt to 
derive this. 
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In fact, introducing Leibniz’s Law into logic in its limited form does entail 
its application to all formulas of the standard version of the Predicate 
Calculus. I shall show this by providing an outline of an inductive proof of 
this claim. (In order not to make this paper too technical, some of the 
results are only stated; in all these cases establishing them shouldn’t be 
difficult for anyone familiar with the relevant systems.) The proof is by 
induction on formula complexity (see Mendelson 1996, 96). Let us assume 
our calculus contains only three logical constants: ¬, ∧ and ∀. 
 
First, LL applies, by definition, to all atomic formulas. 
 
Assume LL applies to any formulas A(a) and B(a), and let us show that it 
applies to A(a) ∧ B(a). That is, we have to show that if a = b and 
A(a) ∧ B(a), then (A(a) ∧ B(a))(b/a), namely A(b/a) ∧ B(b/a). The proof 
proceeds as follows: 
1  (1) A(a) ∧ B(a)          Premise 
2  (2) a = b           Premise 
1  (3) A(a)           Conjunction Elimination 1 
1  (4) B(a)           Conjunction Elimination 1 
1, 2 (5) A(b/a)          LL was assumed to apply to A(a) 
1, 2 (6) B(b/a)          LL was assumed to apply to B(a) 
1, 2 (7) A(b/a) ∧ B(b/a)         Conjunction Introduction 5, 6 
I skip the proof for ¬. We now prove the theorem for ∀xA(x, a), assuming 
that LL applies to all formulas A(c/x, a), in which a constant c replaced all 
occurrences of x in A(x, a). We have to show that if a = b and ∀xA(x, a), 
then ∀xA(x, b/a). 
1  (1) ∀xA(x, a)  Premise 
2  (2) a = b   Premise 
1  (3) A(c/x, a)  Universal Elimination 1 (‘c’ shouldn’t 
     occur in (1) or (2)) 
1, 2 (4) A(c/x, b/a)  LL was assumed to apply to A(c/x, a) 
1, 2 (5) ∀xA(x, b/a)  Universal Introduction 4 
Accordingly, introducing Leibniz’s Law in its limited form, in which it 
applies only to atomic formulas, suffices for its applicability to all formulas 
of the standard version of the Predicate Calculus. 
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Since what can be proved should not be given the status of a principle, the 
proof system does not justify introducing Leibniz’s Law in more than its 
limited form. 
 
Semantic considerations also show that if Leibniz’s Law is introduced as a 
principle in its limited form then it generalises to all formulas of the 
standard version of the Predicate Calculus. Namely, if the semantics 
respects Leibniz’s Law in its limited form, as well as the standard truth-
value rules for connectives and quantifiers, the applicability in the 
semantics of Leibniz’s Law to all formulas of the standard version of the 
Predicate Calculus follows. In the semantics, Leibniz’s Law in its limited 
form means that if V is a function that specifies the truth-values of formulas 
in a model, and V[a = b] = T, then for every n-place predicate Pn, 
V[Pn(…a…)] = V[Pn(…b/a…)]. 
 
The proof of this claim is again by induction on formula complexity. Here 
I shall show it only for the case of negation. Namely, we assume that 
V[a = b] = T and that V[A(a)] = V[A(b/a)], and show that 
V[¬A(a)] = V[¬A(b/a)]. Since we assume that the semantics respects the 
truth-value rules for connectives, for any formula φ, V[¬φ] = T if V[φ] = F 
and V[¬φ] = F if V[φ] = T. Accordingly, V[¬A(b/a)] = T (F) just in case 
V[A(b/a)] = F (T), which holds, according to our assumption, if and only 
if V[A(a)] = F (T), but then V[¬A(a)] = T (F), which is what we had to 
prove. 
 
Again, since it is unjustified to introduce a rule as a principle if it follows 
from another, less general principle, the semantics also does not justify 
conferring the status of a principle on Leibniz’s Law in its general form. 
 
We see that both intuitively and formally, and the latter for both provability 
and semantic considerations, it is unjustified to introduce Leibniz’s Law in 
more than its limited form, namely as applying only to atomic formulas. 
 
This revision of Leibniz’s Law has significant consequences when we 
move to modal logic. Given the standard laws of inference, substitutivity 
in modal contexts cannot be proved, even for a system as strong as S5. 
Namely, generally 
a = b, □A(a) ⊬ □A(b/a) 
(I do not provide here a proof of this improvability; it can be proved from 
the soundness of the modal systems.) This renders invalid the move from 
line (3) to line (4) in the proof that opened this paper, namely from □(a = a) 
to □(a = b). No other proof of the conclusion can be provided. 
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The case is similar with the semantics of modal logic. Namely, we can 
adopt as a semantic principle Leibniz’s Law in its limited form without 
identity being necessary. For instance, in possible-worlds semantics, if ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ designate one object α at world w1 but two different objects, α and 
β, at world w2 which is accessible from w1, then although ‘a = b’ is true at 
w1, ‘□(a = b)’ is false at it (because ‘a = b’ is false at w2); at the same time, 
if ‘Pn(…a…)’ is true at w1, then so is ‘Pn(…b/a…)’. We thus have, with 
‘a = a’ as ‘A(a)’ and ‘a = b’ as ‘A(b/a)’: 
a = b, Pn(…a…) ⊨ Pn(…b/a…) 
                           a = b, □A(a) ⊭ □A(b/a) 
It can be shown that if we limit Leibniz’s Law in the ways described above 
to atomic formulas in both the proof systems and the semantics of the 
common formal systems, these systems remain sound and complete. 2 
Limiting Leibniz’s Law in this way therefore does not have any 
undesirable metalogical consequences. 
 
Of course, one can force a semantics that makes identity necessary, which 
is the semantics that has standardly been used. Namely, one can stipulate 
that if ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate α at world w1 then both designate α at any 
world accessible from w1. The point is that formal considerations do not 
justify such a stipulation. 
 
The necessity of distinctness, proved by using the necessity of identity 
(see, for instance, (Burgess 2011, 319)), is also invalid once we limit 
Leibniz’s Law to n-place predicates. 
 
To conclude, if we adopt as a logical principle the form of Leibniz’s Law 
which I find more intuitive and logically justified, namely, the form 
applicable only to properties and relations, the necessity of identity does 
not follow from formal considerations, and this without having any 
undesirable formal consequences. One might try to provide other reasons 
for this alleged necessity, as metaphysicians have tried to do (whether 
successfully or not is not the subject of this paper). If successful, necessary 
identity can then be represented in our logic systems. Yet from a logical 
point of view, identity is better left contingent.3 
 
 
                                                 
2 For some discussion of modal systems with contingent identity, see Hughes and Cresswell 
(1996: 330ff). 
3  Thanks to Daniel Kodaj, Ran Lanzet, Edi Pavlovic and an anonymous referee for 
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